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Abstract
In April 2006, Massachusetts passed legislation aimed at achieving near-
universal health insurance coverage. The key features of this legislation were
a model for national health reform, passed in March 2010. The reform gives
us a novel opportunity to examine the impact of expansion to near-universal
coverage state-wide. Among hospital discharges in Massachusetts, we find
that the reform decreased uninsurance by 36% relative to its initial level
and to other states. Reform affected utilization by decreasing length of stay,
the number of inpatient admissions originating from the emergency room,
and preventable admissions. At the same time, hospital cost growth did not
increase.
Keywords: health, health care, health reform, insurance, hospitals,
Massachusetts, preventive care
1. Introduction
In April 2006, the state of Massachusetts passed legislation aimed at
achieving near-universal health insurance coverage. This legislation has been
considered by many to be a model for the national health reform legislation
passed in March 2010. In light of both reforms, it is of great policy impor-
tance to understand the impact of a growth in coverage to near-universal
∗Corresponding author. Mailing address: Department of Economics, Yale
University, Box 208264, New Haven, CT 06520-8264, United States. E-mail:
amanda.kowalski@yale.edu. Telephone: +1-202-670-7631. Fax: +1-203-432-6323.
Email addresses: jkolstad@wharton.upenn.edu (Jonathan T. Kolstad),
amanda.kowalski@yale.edu (Amanda E. Kowalski)
Preprint submitted to Journal of Public Economics May 24, 2012
levels, unprecedented in the United States. In theory, insurance coverage
could increase or decrease the intensity and cost of health care, depending
on the underlying demand for care and its impact on health care delivery.
Which effect dominates in practice is an empirical question.
Although previous researchers have studied the impact of expansions in
health insurance coverage, these studies have focused on specific subpopu-
lations – the indigent, children, and the elderly (see e.g.Currie and Gruber
(1996); Finkelstein (2007); Card et al. (2008); Finkelstein et al. (2012)). The
Massachusetts reform gives us a novel opportunity to examine the impact of
a policy that achieved near-universal health insurance coverage among the
entire state population. Furthermore, the magnitude of the expansion in cov-
erage after the Massachusetts reform is similar to the predicted magnitude of
the coverage expansion in the national reform. In this paper, we are the first
to use hospital data to examine the impact of this legislation on insurance
coverage, patient outcomes, and utilization patterns in Massachusetts. We
use a difference-in-differences strategy that compares Massachusetts after the
reform to Massachusetts before the reform and to other states.
The first question we address is whether the Massachusetts reform re-
sulted in reductions in uninsurance. We consider overall changes in coverage
as well as changes in the composition of types of coverage among the entire
state population and the population who were hospitalized. One potential
impact of expansions in publicly subsidized coverage is to crowd-out private
insurance (Cutler and Gruber (1996)). The impact of the reform on the com-
position of coverage allows us to consider crowd-out in the population as a
whole as well as among those in the inpatient setting.
After estimating changes in the presence and composition of coverage,
we turn to the impact of the reform on hospital and preventive care. We
first study the intensity of care provided. Because health insurance low-
ers the price of health care services to consumers, a large-scale expansion
in coverage has the potential to increase demand for health care services,
the intensity of treatment, and cost. Potentially magnifying this effect are
general equilibrium shifts in the way care is supplied due to the large mag-
nitude of the expansion (Finkelstein (2007)). Countervailing this effect is
the monopsonistic role of insurance plans in setting prices and quantities for
hospital services. To the extent that health reform altered the negotiating
position of insurers vis a vis hospitals, expansions in coverage could actually
reduce supply of services, intensity of treatment, or costs. Furthermore, the
existence of insurance itself can also alter the provision of care in the hospital
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directly (e.g. substitution towards services that are reimbursed). Without
coverage, patients could face barriers to receiving follow up treatment (typi-
cally dispensed in an outpatient setting or as drug prescriptions); potentially
reducing the efficacy of the inpatient care they receive or altering the length
of time they stay in the hospital. Achieving near-universal insurance could
alter length of stay and other measures of services intensity though physical
limits on the number of beds in the hospital, efforts to increase through-
put in response to changes in profitability, or changes in care provided when
physicians face a pool of patients with more homogeneous coverage (Glied
and Zivin (2002)). Given these competing hypotheses, expanded insurance
coverage could raise or lower the intensity of care provided.
In addition to changes in the production process within a hospital, we
are interested in the impact of insurance coverage on how patients enter the
health care system and access preventive care. We first examine changes in
the use of the emergency room (ER) as a point of entry for inpatient care.
Because hospitals must provide at least some care, regardless of insurance
status, the ER is a potentially important point of access to hospital care for
the uninsured.1 When the ER is the primary point of entry into the hospital,
changes in admissions from the ER can impact welfare for a variety of reasons.
First, the cost of treating patients in the ER is likely higher than the cost of
treating the same patient in another setting. Second, the emergency room is
designed to treat acute health events. If the ER is a patient’s primary point
of care, then he might not receive preventive care that could mitigate future
severe and costly health events. To the extent that uninsurance led people to
use the ER as a point of entry for treatment that they otherwise would have
sought through another channel, we expect to see a decline in the number of
inpatient admissions originating in the ER.
We also study the impact of insurance on access to care outside of the
inpatient setting. Using a methodology developed by the Agency for Health-
care Research and Quality (AHRQ), we are able to study preventive care in
an outpatient setting using inpatient data. We identify inpatient admissions
that should not occur in the presence of sufficient preventive care. If the
reform facilitated increased preventive care, then we expect a reduction in
1Under the Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act (EMTALA), hospitals must
provide stabilizing care and examination to people who arrive in the ER for an emergency
condition without considering whether a person is insured or their ability to pay.
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the number of inpatient admissions meeting these criteria. These measures
also indirectly measure health in the form of averted hospitalizations. We
augment this analysis with data on direct measures of access to and use of
outpatient and preventive care.
Finally, we turn to the impact of the reform on the cost of hospital
care. We examine hospital-level measures of operating costs (e.g. overhead,
salaries, and equipment) that include both fixed and variable costs. This
allows us to jointly measure the direct effect of insurance on cost – the rela-
tive effect of changing the out of pocket price – as well as the potential for
quality competition at the hospital level. In the latter case, hospitals fac-
ing consumers who are relatively less price elastic (or more quality elastic)
increase use of costly services and may also increase use of variable inputs
as well as investments in large capital projects in order to attract price-
insensitive customers (Dranove and Satterthwaite (1992)). In the extreme,
large expansions in coverage might lead to a so called “medical arms race,”
in which hospitals make investments in large capital projects to attract cus-
tomers and are subsequently able to increase demand to cover these fixed
costs (Robinson and Luft (1987)). The impact of all of these effects would
be increased hospital costs as coverage approaches near-universal levels.
Our analysis relies on three main data sets. To examine the impact on
coverage in Massachusetts as a whole, we analyze data from the Current
Population Survey (CPS). To examine coverage among the hospitalized pop-
ulation, health care utilization, and preventive care, we analyze the universe
of hospital discharges from a nationally-representative sample of approxi-
mately 20 percent of hospitals in the United States from the Healthcare Cost
and Utilization Project (HCUP) National Inpatient Sample (NIS). In addi-
tion, we use the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS) data
to augment our study of access and preventive care.
We find a variety of results pointing to an impact of the Massachusetts
reform on insurance coverage, hospital, and preventive care. First, we find
a significant reduction in uninsurance both in the general population and
among those who are hospitalized. In the population as a whole, we find
that uninsurance declined by roughly 6 percentage points, or by about 50%
of its initial level. This decline primarily came through increased coverage by
employer-sponsored health insurance (ESHI), which accounted for nearly half
the change, and secondarily through Medicaid and newly subsidized cover-
age available through the Massachusetts connector. Turning to hospital and
preventive care, we find that length of stay in the hospital fell significantly,
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particularly for long hospital stays. We also find a significant reduction emer-
gency room utilization that resulted in an inpatient admission. Admissions
originating in the ER declined by 5.2%. The impact on ER utilization was
largest in poorer geographic areas. Our results provide some mixed evidence
for a decline in preventable admissions to the hospital. Without includ-
ing covariates that capture patient severity, we find limited evidence that the
reform reduced preventable admissions. However, in a specification that con-
trols for patient severity, we find clear evidence that preventable admissions
were reduced. Finally, we find little evidence that the Massachusetts reform
affected hospital cost growth. Massachusetts hospital costs appear to have
been growing faster than the remainder of the country prior to reform and
to have continued on the same trajectory.
In the next section, we describe the elements of the reform and its imple-
mentation, as well as the limited existing research on its impact. In the third
section, we describe the data. In the fourth section, we present the difference-
in-differences results for the impact of the reform on insurance coverage and
hospital and preventive care. In the fifth section, we discuss the implications
of our findings for national reform. In the sixth section, we conclude and
discuss our continuing work in this area.
2. Description of the Reform
The recent Massachusetts health insurance legislation, Chapter 58, in-
cluded several features, the most salient of which was a mandate for individ-
uals to obtain health insurance coverage or pay a tax penalty. All individuals
were required to obtain coverage, with the exception of individuals with reli-
gious objections and individuals whose incomes were too high to qualify for
state health insurance subsidies but too low for health insurance to be “af-
fordable,” as determined by the Massachusetts Health Insurance Connector
Authority. For a broad summary of the reform, see McDonough et al. (2006);
for details on the implementation of the reform see The Massachusetts Health
Insurance Connector Authority (2008).
The reform also extended free and subsidized health insurance to low in-
come populations in two forms: expansions in the existing Medicaid program
(called “MassHealth” in Massachusetts), and the launch of a new program
called CommCare. First, as part of the Medicaid expansion, the reform ex-
panded Medicaid eligibility for children to 300 percent of poverty, and it
restored benefits to special populations who had lost coverage during the
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2002-2003 fiscal crisis, such as the long-term unemployed. The reform also
facilitated outreach efforts to Medicaid-eligible individuals and families. Im-
plementation of the reform was staggered, and Medicaid changes were among
the first to take effect. According to one source, “Because enrollment caps
were removed from one Medicaid program and income eligibility was raised
for two others, tens of thousands of the uninsured were newly enrolled just
ten weeks after the law was signed” (Kingsdale (2009), page w591).
Second, the reform extended free and subsidized coverage through a new
program called CommCare. CommCare offered free coverage to individuals
up to 150 percent of poverty and three tiers of subsidized coverage up to
300 percent of poverty. CommCare plans were sold through a new, state-run
health insurance exchange.
In addition, the reform created a new online health insurance market-
place called the Connector, where individuals who did not qualify for free or
subsidized coverage could purchase health insurance coverage. Unsubsidized
CommChoice plans available through the Connector from several health in-
surers offered three regulated levels of coverage – bronze, silver, and gold.
Young Adult plans with fewer benefits were also made available to individ-
uals age 26 and younger. Individuals were also free to continue purchasing
health insurance through their employers or to purchase health insurance
directly from insurers.
The reform also implemented changes in the broader health insurance
market. It merged the individual and small group health insurance markets.
Existing community rating regulations, which required premiums to be set
regardless of certain beneficiary characteristics of age and gender, remained
in place, though it gave new authority to insurers to price policies based on
smoking status. It also required all family plans to cover young adults for at
least two years beyond loss of dependent status, up to age 26.
Another important aspect of the reform was an employer mandate that
required employers with more than 10 full time employees to offer health
insurance to employees and contribute a certain amount to premiums or pay
a penalty. The legislation allowed employers to designate the Connector as
its “employer-group health benefit plan” for the purposes of federal law.
The financing for the reform came from a number of different sources.
Some funding for the subsidies was financed by the dissolution of existing
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state uncompensated care pools.2 Addressing costs associated with the re-
form remains an important policy issue.
The national health reform legislation passed in March 2010 shares many
features of the Massachusetts reform, including an individual mandate to ob-
tain health insurance coverage, new requirements for employers, expansions
in subsidized care, state-level health insurance marketplaces modeled on the
Massachusetts Connector, and new requirements for insurers to cover depen-
dents to age 26, to name a few. For a summary of the national legislation, see
Kaiser Family Foundation (2010). Taken together, the main characteristics
of the reform bear strong similarity to those in the Massachusetts reform, and
the impact of the Massachusetts reform should offer insight into the likely
impact of the national reform.
As Chapter 58 was enacted recently, there has been relatively little re-
search on its impact to date. Long (2008) presents results on the preliminary
impact of the reform from surveys administered in 2006 and 2007. Yelowitz
and Cannon (2010) examine the impact of the reform on coverage using data
from the March 2006-2009 Supplements to the Current Population Survey
(CPS). They also examine changes in self-reported health status in an effort
to capture the effect of the reform on health. Using this measure of health,
they find little evidence of health effects. The NIS discharge data allow us
to examine utilization and health effects in much greater detail. Long et al.
(2009) perform an earlier analysis using one fewer year of the same data.
Long et al. (2009) and Yelowitz and Cannon (2010) find a decline in unin-
surance among the population age 18 to 64 of 6.6 and 6.7 percentage points,
respectively. We also rely on the CPS for preliminary analysis. Our esti-
mates using the CPS are similar in magnitude to the prior studies, though
our sample differs in that we include all individuals under age 65 and at
all income levels. Our main results, however, focus on administrative data
from hospitals. This builds on the existing literature by considering coverage
changes specifically amongst those who were hospitalized, as well as extend-
2In addition to the ability to re-appropriate funds from the uncompensated care pool,
Massachusetts obtained a Medicaid waiver that allowed the reallocation of Disproportion-
ate Share Hospital (DSH) payments towards the reduction of uninsurance. Thus, payments
that previously went to hospitals treating a disproportionate share of Medicaid or unin-
sured were incorporated into the subsidies used to pay for expansions in coverage (Grady
(2006)). Changes in DSH payments could have shifted incentives at some hospitals more
than others (Duggan (2000)).
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ing the analysis beyond coverage alone to focus on hospital and preventive
care.
3. Description of the Data
For our main analysis, we focus on a nationally-representative sample of
hospital discharges. Hospital discharge data offer several advantages over
other forms of data to examine the impact of Chapter 58. First, though hos-
pital discharge data offer only limited information on the overall population,
they offer a great deal of information on a population of great policy interest
– individuals who are sick. This population is most vulnerable to changes in
coverage due to the fact that they are already sick, and they disproportion-
ately come from demographic groups that are at higher risk, such as minority
groups and the indigent. Inpatient care also represents a disproportionate
fraction of total health care costs. Second, hospital discharge data allow
us to observe the insured and the uninsured, regardless of payer, and payer
information is likely to be more accurate than it is in survey data. Third,
hospital discharge data allow us to examine treatment patterns and some
health outcomes in great detail. In addition, relative to the CPS, hospital
discharge data allow us to examine changes in medical expenditure, subject
to limitations discussed below. One disadvantage of hospital discharge data
relative to the CPS is that the underlying sample of individuals in our data
could have changed as a result of the reform. We use many techniques to
examine selection as an outcome of the reform and to control for selection in
the analysis of other outcomes.
Our data are from the Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project (HCUP)
Nationwide Inpatient Sample (NIS). Each year of NIS data is a stratified
sample of 20 percent of United States community hospitals, designed to be
nationally representative.3 The data contain the universe of all hospital
discharges, regardless of payer, for each hospital in the data in each year.
3“Community hospitals” are defined by the American Hospital Association as “all non-
Federal, short-term, general, and other specialty hospitals, excluding hospital units of
institutions” (Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (2004 – 2007)). The sample
is stratified by geographic region – Northeast vs. Midwest vs. West vs. South; control –
government vs. private not-for-profit vs. private investor-owned; location – urban vs. rural;
teaching status – teaching vs. non-teaching; and bed size – small vs. medium vs. large.
Implicit stratification variables include state and three-digit zip code.
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Because a large fraction of hospitals appear in several years of the data, we
can use hospital identifiers to examine changes within hospitals over time.
We focus on the most recently available NIS data for the years 2004 to
2008. Our full sample includes a total of 36,362,108 discharges for individuals
of all ages. An advantage of these data relative to the March Supplement to
the CPS is that they allow us to examine the impact of the reform quarterly
instead of annually. Because some aspects of the reform, such as Medicaid
expansions, were implemented immediately after the reform, but other re-
forms were staggered, we do not want to include the period immediately
following the reform in the After or the Before period. To be conservative,
we define the After reform period to include all observations in the third
quarter of 2007 and later. The After period represents the time after July
1, 2007, when one of the most salient features of the reform, the individual
health insurance mandate, took effect. We denote the During period as the
year from 2006 Q3 through 2007 Q2, and we use this period to analyze the
immediate impact of the reform before the individual mandate took effect.
The Before period includes 2004 Q1 through 2006 Q2.4
In total, from 2004-2008, the data cover 42 states – Alabama, Alaska,
Delaware, Idaho, Mississippi, Montana, North Dakota, and New Mexico are
not available in any year because they did not provide data to the NIS. The
data include the universe of discharges from a total of 3,090 unique hospitals,
with 48 in Massachusetts. The unit of observation in the data and in our
main analysis is the hospital discharge. To account for stratification, we use
discharge weights in all summary statistics and regressions.
4. Difference-in-Differences Empirical Results
4.1. Impact on Insurance Coverage in the Overall and Inpatient Hospital
Populations
We begin by considering the issue that was the primary motivation for
the Massachusetts reform – the expansion of health insurance coverage. Be-
fore focusing on inpatient hospitalizations, we place this population in the
4Unfortunately, Massachusetts did not provide Q4 data to the NIS in 2006 or 2007. To
address this limitation, we drop all data from all states in 2006 Q4 and 2007 Q4. Potential
users of these data should note that to address this limitation, the NIS relabeled some
data from the first three quarters of the year in 2006 and 2007 MA as Q4 data. Using
information provided by NIS, we recovered the unaltered data for use here.
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context of the general population using data from the 2004 to 2009 March
Supplements to the Current Population Survey (CPS). In most of our re-
sults, we focus on the nonelderly population because the reform was geared
toward the nonelderly population (elderly with coverage through Medicare
were explicitly excluded from purchasing subsidized CommCare plans, but
they were eligible for Medicaid expansions if they met the income eligibility
criteria).5
Figure 1 depicts trends in total insurance coverage of all types among
nonelderly in the CPS. The upper line shows trends in coverage in Mas-
sachusetts, and the lower line shows trends in coverage in all other states.
From the upper line, it is apparent that Massachusetts started with a higher
baseline level of coverage than the average among other states. The average
level of coverage among the nonelderly in Massachusetts prior to the reform
(2004-2006 CPS) was 88.2 percent.6 This increased to a mean coverage level
of 93.8 percent in the 2008-2009 CPS.7 In contrast, the remainder of the coun-
try had relative stable rates of nonelderly coverage: 82.7 percent pre-reform
5Because the reform was geared toward the nonelderly, we considered using the elderly
as an additional control group in our difference-in-differences estimates. However, we did
not pursue this identification strategy for three reasons: first, the elderly were eligible for
some elements of the reform; second, the elderly are less healthy overall and suffer from
different types of health shocks than the younger individuals of interest to us; and third, we
find some increases in coverage for the elderly. Although many assume that the elderly are
universally covered through Medicare, some estimates suggest that 4.5 percent or more
of the elderly population are not eligible for full federally subsidized coverage through
Medicare Part A, so coverage increases are possible in this population (Gray et al. (2006),
Birnbaum and Patchias (2008)).
6We follow the Census Bureau in defining types of coverage and uninsurance. These
definitions and the associated code to implement them are available from http://www.
census.gov/hhes/www/hlthins/hlthinsvar.html. For individuals who report having
both Medicaid and Medicare (“dual eligibles”), we code Medicaid as their primary in-
surance type. We make the additional assumption that individuals who are covered by
private health insurance but not by an employer-sponsored plan are in the private market
unrelated to employment.
7Results from 2007 are difficult to interpret because the reform was in the midst of
being implemented in March, when the CPS survey was taken. Medicaid expansions had
occurred at that point but the individual mandate was not implemented until July 2007.
We thus focus on the period that was clearly before the full reform – CPS March supple-
ment answers from 2004-2006 – compared to 2008-2009. Note that we use more precise
definitions of the periods before, during, and after the reform in the NIS, as described in
the text. We have made these definitions as comparable as possible across all data sets.
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and 82.5 percent post-reform. For the entire population, including those over
65, coverage in Massachusetts went from 89.5 percent to 94.5 percent for the
same periods while the remainder of the country saw a small decline from
84.6 percent insured pre-reform to 84.4 percent insured post-reform.8
Appendix Table A1 formalizes this comparison of means with difference-
in-differences regression results from the CPS. These results suggest that the
Massachusetts reform was successful in expanding health insurance coverage
in the population. The estimated reduction in nonelderly uninsurance of 5.7
percentage points represents a 48 percent reduction relative to the pre-reform
rate of nonelderly uninsurance in Massachusetts.9 To some, the decrease
in uninsurance experienced by Massachusetts may appear small. To put
this in perspective, the national reform targets a reduction in uninsurance
of a similar magnitude. The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services,
Office of the Actuary, National Health Statistics Group, predicts a decrease
in uninsurance of 7.1 percentage points nationally from 2009 to 2019 (Truffer
et al. (2010)).
4.1.1. Regression Results on the Impact on Uninsurance
Using the NIS data, we begin by estimating a simple difference-in-differences
specification. Our primary estimating equation is:
Ydht = α + β(MA
∗After)ht + γ(MA
∗During)ht (1)
+
∑
h
ρh(Hosp = h)h +
∑
t
φtYearQuarter t + X
′
dhtδ + εdht,
where Y is an outcome variable for hospital discharge d in hospital h at time
t. The coefficient of interest, β, gives the impact of the reform – the change
in coverage after the reform relative to before the reform in Massachusetts
relative to other states. Analogously, γ gives the change in coverage during
the reform relative to before the reform in Massachusetts relative to other
8The initial coverage level in Massachusetts was clearly higher than the national aver-
age, though it was not a particular outlier. Using data from the 2004, 2005, and 2006 CPS,
we rank states in terms of insurance coverage. In this time period, Massachusetts had the
seventh highest level of coverage among the nonelderly in the US. It was one of 17 states
with 88 percent or higher share of the population insured, and its initial coverage rate was
only 1.7 percentage points higher than the 86.5 percent coverage rate in the median state.
9In tables that can be found in Kolstad and Kowalski (2010), we present estimates of
the decline in uninsurance for each age, gender, income, and race category using the CPS.
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states. The identification assumption is that there were no factors outside of
the reform that differentially affected Massachusetts relative to other states
after the reform. We also include hospital and quarterly time fixed effects.
Thus, identification comes from comparing hospitals to themselves over time
in Massachusetts compared to other states, after flexibly allowing for season-
ality and trends over time. We include hospital fixed effects to account for
the fact that the NIS is an unbalanced panel of hospitals. Without hospital
fixed effects, we are concerned that change in outcomes could be driven by
changes in the sample of hospitals in either Massachusetts or control states
(primarily the former since the sample is nationally representative but is not
necessarily representative within each state) after the reform.10 Our preferred
specification includes time and hospital fixed effects.11
For each outcome variable of interest, we also estimate models that in-
corporate a vector X of patient demographics and other risk adjustment
variables. We do not control for these variables in our main specifications
because we are interested in measuring the impact of the reform as broadly
as possible. To the extent that the reform changed the composition of the
sample of inpatient discharges based on these observable characteristics, we
would obscure this effect by controlling for observable patient characteris-
tics. Beyond our main specifications, the impact of the reform on outcomes
holding the patient population fixed is also highly relevant. For this reason,
in other specifications, we incorporate state-of-the-art risk adjusters, and
we present a number of specifications focused on understanding changes in
patient composition. We return to this in more detail below. In general,
however, we find that though there is some evidence of selection, it is not
large enough to alter the robustness of our findings with respect to coverage
or most other outcomes.
We use linear probability models for all of our binary outcomes. Under
10Restricting the sample to the balanced panel of the 52 hospitals that are in the sample
in all possible quarters (2004 Q1 to 2008 Q4, excluding 2006 Q4 and 2007 Q4) eliminates
approximately 98 percent of hospitals and 97 percent of discharges, likely making the
sample less representative, so we do not make this restriction in our main specifications.
However, in the last panel of Appendix Table 7, we present our main specifications using
only the balanced panel, and the results are not statistically different from the main results.
11It is possible that insurance coverage changes which hospital people visit, in which case
the bias from the use of hospital fixed effects would be of ambiguous sign. However, we
are not able to investigate this claim since we do not have longitudinal patient identifiers.
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each coefficient, we report asymptotic 95 percent confidence intervals, clus-
tered to allow for arbitrary correlations between observations within a state.
Following Bertrand et al. (2004), we also report 95 percent confidence inter-
vals obtained by block bootstrap by state, as discussed in Appendix A. In
practice, the confidence intervals obtained through both methods are very
similar. To conserve space, we do not report the block bootstrapped standard
errors in some tables.
In addition to the specifications we present here, we consider a number
of robustness checks to investigate the internal and external validity of our
results. We find that the conclusions presented in Table 1 are robust to
a variety of alternative control groups and do not appear to be driven by
unobserved factors that are unique to Massachusetts. For brevity, we present
and discuss these results in Appendix B.
Given our short time period, we are particularly concerned about pre-
trends in Massachusetts relative to control states. In Figures 2 3, and 4,
we present quarterly trends for each of our outcome variables of interest for
Massachusetts and the remainder of the country. Each line and the associ-
ated confidence interval are coefficient estimates for each quarter for Mas-
sachusetts and non-Massachusetts states in a regression that includes hospital
fixed effects. The omitted category for each is the first quarter of 2004, which
we set equal to 0. While the plots show slight variation, none of our outcomes
of interest appear to have strong pre-reform trends in Massachusetts relative
to control states that might explain our findings.12
4.1.2. Effects on the Composition of Insurance Coverage among Hospital
Discharges
In this section, we investigate the effect of the Massachusetts reform on
the level and composition of health insurance coverage in the sample of hos-
pital discharges. We divide health insurance coverage (or lack thereof) into
five mutually exclusive types – Uninsured, Medicaid, Private, Medicare, and
Other. CommCare plans and other government plans such as Workers’ Com-
pensation and CHAMPUS (but not Medicaid and Medicare) are included
12When we formalize this visual analysis in results not reported, we find slightly different
trends in Massachusetts, some with statistical significance. However, the magnitude of
these effects is generally small relative to the MA∗After coefficients for each outcome.
Taken together, this evidence suggests that our estimates are unlikely to be driven by
differential pre-reform trends in Massachusetts.
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in Other. We estimate equation (1) separately for each coverage type and
report the results in columns 1 through 5 of Table 1.13 We focus on results
for the nonelderly here, and we report results for the full sample and for the
elderly only in Table 5.
Column 1 presents the estimated effect of the reform on the overall level
of uninsurance. We find that the reform led to a 2.31 percentage point
reduction in uninsurance. Both sets of confidence intervals show that the
difference-in-differences impact of the reform on uninsurance is statistically
significant at the 1 percent level. Since the model with fixed effects obscures
the main effects of MA and After, we also report mean coverage rates in
Massachusetts and other states before and after the reform. The estimated
impact of Chapter 58 represents an economically significant reduction in
uninsured discharges of roughly 36 percent (2.31/6.43) of the Massachusetts
pre-reform mean. We present coefficients on selected covariates from this
regression in column 1 of Appendix Table A3.
We see from the difference-in-differences results in column 2 of Table 1
that among the nonelderly hospitalized population, the expansion in Medi-
caid coverage was larger than the overall reduction in uninsurance. Medicaid
coverage expanded by 3.89 percentage points, and uninsurance decreased by
2.31 percentage points. Consistent with the timing of the initial Medicaid
expansion, the coefficient on MA∗During suggests that a large fraction of
impact of the Medicaid expansion was realized in the year immediately fol-
lowing the passage of the legislation. It appears that at least some of the
Medicaid expansion crowded out private coverage in the hospital, which de-
creased by 3.06 percentage points. The risk-adjusted coefficient in the last
row of column 2 suggests that even after controlling for selection into the hos-
pital, our finding of crowd-out persists. All of these effects are statistically
significant at the 1 percent level.
To further understand crowd-out and the incidence of the reform on the
hospitalized population relative to the general population, we compare the
estimates from Table 1 – coverage among those who were hospitalized – with
results from the CPS – coverage in the overall population. In Appendix Table
A1, we report difference-in-differences results by coverage type in the CPS.
The coverage categories reported by the CPS do not map exactly to those
13Because these represent mutually exclusive types of coverage, the coefficients sum to
zero across the first five columns.
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used in the NIS. Insurance that is coded as private coverage in the NIS is
divided into employer sponsored coverage and private coverage not related
to employment in the CPS. Furthermore, the Census Bureau coded the new
plans available in Massachusetts, CommCare and CommChoice, as “Medi-
caid.”14 Thus the estimated impact on Medicaid is actually the combined
effect of expansions in traditional Medicaid with increases in CommCare and
CommChoice. Medicaid expansions are larger among the hospital discharge
population than they are in the CPS – a 3.89 percentage point increase vs.
a 3.50 percentage point increase, respectively. Furthermore, the CPS coeffi-
cient is statistically lower than the NIS coefficient. It is not surprising to see
larger gains in coverage in the hospital because hospitals often retroactively
cover Medicaid-eligible individuals who had not signed up for coverage.
Comparing changes in types of coverage in the NIS to changes in types
of coverage in the CPS, we find that crowd-out of private coverage only
occurred among the hospitalized population. In Appendix Table A1, the
magnitudes of the MA∗After coefficients are 0.0345 and 0.0351 for ESHI
and Medicaid respectively. That is, both employer-sponsored and Medicaid,
CommCare or CommChoice coverage increased by a similar amount following
the reform, and those increases were roughly equivalent to the total decline
in uninsurance (5.7 percentage points). The only crowding out in Appendix
Table A1 seems to be of non-group private insurance, though this effect is
relatively small at 0.86 percentage points. Combining coefficients for ESHI
and private insurance unrelated to employment gives us a predicted increase
in private coverage (as it is coded in the NIS) of 2.59 percentage points.
This is in marked contrast with the 3.54 percentage point decrease in private
coverage that we observe in the NIS.
Returning to the NIS, we look further at results from other specifications.
14We thank the Census Bureau staff for their rapid and thorough response to the many
calls we made to confirm this decision on categorizing the new types of plans. Since the
CommChoice plans are coded as Medicaid in the CPS, we are concerned that estimated
increases in Medicaid coverage in the CPS should could lead to overestimates of crowd-
out because the estimated Medicaid expansion could include individuals who transitioned
from private market unsubsidized care to CommChoice unsubsidized care. To investigate
this possibility, in unreported regressions, we divide the sample by income to exclude
individuals who are not eligible for subsidized care. The results suggest an increase in
“Medicaid” coverage for people above 300 percent of the FPL of 0.6 percentage points.
Thus, the bulk of the effect on Medicaid reflects some form of publicly subsidized coverage
and not unsubsidized CommChoice plans coded as Medicaid.
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Our results also indicate a statistically significant change in the number of
non-elderly covered by Medicare. The magnitude of the effect, however, is
quite small both in level of coverage and in change relative to the baseline
share of non-elderly inpatient admissions covered by Medicare. Other cover-
age, the general category that includes other types of government coverage
including CommCare, increased by a statistically significant 1.06 percentage
points. We restrict the dependent variable to include only CommCare in
specification 6. By definition, CommCare coverage is zero outside of Mas-
sachusetts and before the reform. CommCare increased by 1.24 percentage
points. The coefficient is larger than the overall increase in Other coverage,
though the difference in the coefficients is not statistically significant. As
reported in specification 7, the probability of having missing coverage infor-
mation also increased after the reform, but this increase was small relative
to the observed increases in coverage.
4.2. Impacts on Health Care Provision
Having established the impact of the Massachusetts reform on coverage,
we next turn to our primary focus: understanding the impact of achieving
near-universal health insurance coverage on health care delivery and cost. In
the next four subsections, we estimate equation (1) with dependent variables
that capture the decision to seek care, the intensity of services provided
conditional on seeking care, preventive care, and hospital costs.
4.2.1. Impact on Hospital Volume and Patient Composition
One potential impact of the reform could be to increase the use of inpa-
tient hospital services. Whether more people accessed health insurance after
the reform is of intrinsic interest as this implies a change in welfare due to
the policy (e.g. an increase in moral hazard through insurance or a decrease
in ex ante barriers to accessing the hospital due to insurance). Beyond this,
changes in the composition of patients present an important empirical hurdle
to estimating the causal impact of the reform on subsequent measures of care
delivered. If the number of patients seeking care after the reform increased
and the marginal patients differed in underlying health status, changes in
treatment intensity could reflect this, rather than actual changes in the way
care is delivered. We investigate this possibility in two ways: first, we ex-
amine changes in the number of discharges at the hospital level; second, we
control for observable changes in the health of the patient pool and compare
our results to specifications without controls.
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In Table 2, we investigate selection into hospitals by estimating a series
of specifications with the number of discharges at the hospital-quarter level
as the dependent variable. In column 1 of Table 2, which includes hospital
and quarterly fixed effects to mitigate the impact of changes in sample com-
position, the coefficient on MA∗After indicates that the number of quarterly
discharges for hospitals in Massachusetts was unchanged relative to other
states following the reform. The coefficient estimate of 19 is small relative
to the pre-reform quarterly discharge level of 5,616, and it is not statistically
significant. In column 2, we re-estimate the model with the log of total dis-
charges as the dependent variable to account for any skewness in hospital
size. The coefficient on MA∗After in this specification also indicates that
the reform had no impact on the total volume of discharges. Columns 3
to 6 break down changes in discharges by age category (nonelderly and el-
derly). Among these subgroups we find no statistically significant change
in total elderly or nonelderly discharges in either levels or logs. These find-
ings suggest that any change in the composition of patients would have to
have occurred through substitution since the total number of discharges re-
mained unchanged. However, we are unlikely to pick up a relative change in
discharges among the newly insured in our aggregate measure.15
To deal with changes in the patient population directly, we control for
observable changes in the health of the patient pool using six sets of risk ad-
justment variables: demographic characteristics, the number of diagnoses on
15This is true because the newly insured are a small share of the population. From the
CPS, approximately 12% of people were uninsured before Massachusetts reform. From
Table 2, we see that the average Massachusetts hospital had 5,616 discharges before reform,
of which 6.43% were for the uninsured (see Table 1). Thus, the insured 88% of the
population was responsible for 5,254 discharges, and the uninsured 12% of the population
was responsible for 361 discharges. The discharge rate was twice as high for the insured as
for the uninsured. From our difference-in-differences results from the CPS, roughly half of
the previously uninsured, 6% of the population, gained coverage. If these individuals, now
insured, increased utilization such that had the same level of discharges as those previously
insured, then we would expect that they would have 358 (=5,254* 6/88) discharges after
reform. Since they already had 180 (=361*(6/12)) discharges before reform, the change
in their utilization rate would result in an additional 178 (=358-180) discharges. Given
that our 95% confidence interval on the hospital discharge regression in Table 2 is [-183,
220], we can only reject the null of no change in discharges if discharges change by more
than 403. Thus, we could not distinguish an increase in 178 discharges from no change
in discharges. The newly insured would have to increase their utilization by 3.25 times
((3.25*180)-180=405) for us to detect the change 95% of the time.
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the discharge record, individual components of the Charlson Score measure
of comorbidities, AHRQ comorbidity measures, All-Patient Refined Diagno-
sis Related Groups (APR-DRGs), and All-Payer Severity-adjusted Diagnosis
Related Groups (APS-DRGs). We discuss these measures in depth in Ap-
pendix C. These measures are a valid means to control for selection if un-
observable changes in health are correlated with the changes in health that
we observe. We interpret our risk-adjusted specifications assuming that this
untestable condition holds, with the caveat that if it does not hold, we cannot
interpret our results without a model of selection.
In results presented in the second panel of Table 2, we estimate our model
with a subset of our measures of patient severity as the dependent variable.
For this exercise, we focus on the six sets of severity measures that are sim-
plest to specify as outcome variables. This allows us to observe some direct
changes in the population severity in Massachusetts after the reform. These
results present a mixed picture of the underlying patient severity. For four of
the six measures, we find no significant change in severity. Two of the sever-
ity measures, however, saw statistically significant changes after the reform.
The results in specification 8 suggest that the average severity, measured by
the Charlson score, increased following the reform. The model of APS-DRG
charge weights suggests the opposite. Taken together, these results and the
lack of any change in total discharges are not indicative of a consistent pattern
of changes in the patient population within a given hospital in Massachusetts
after the reform relative to before relative to other states.
Despite this general picture, and in light of the results in columns 8 and
13, for all of our outcome variables we estimate the same model incorporating
the vector of covariates X, which flexibly controls for all risk adjusters si-
multaneously. In general, our results are unchanged by the inclusion of these
controls – consistent with the small estimated impact of the reform on the
individual severity measures. If anything, we find that the main results are
strengthened by the inclusion of covariates as we would expect with increased
severity after the reform.
In column 7 of Table 2, we investigate the possibility that either hospital
size increased or sampling variation led to an observed larger size of hospitals
after the reform relative to before the reform by using a separate measure
of hospital size as the dependent variable. This measure, Hospital Bedsize,
which we link to our data from the American Hospital Association (AHA)
annual survey of hospitals, reports the number of beds in each hospital. The
coefficient estimate indicates that hospital size remained very similar after
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the reform for the hospitals in the sample in both periods. The coefficient,
which is not statistically significant, suggests that if anything, there was a
decrease in hospital size by 21 beds.
4.2.2. Impact on Resource Utilization and Length of Stay
Moving beyond the question of the extensive margin decision to go to the
hospital or to admit a patient to the hospital, we turn to the intensity of
services provided conditional on receiving care. The most direct measure of
this is the impact of the reform on length of stay. As discussed earlier, we
expect length of stay to increase in response to increased coverage if newly
insured individuals (or their physician agents) demand more treatment –
that is, if moral hazard or income effects dominate. Alternately, we expect
length of stay to decrease in response to increased coverage if newly insured
individuals are covered by insurers who are better able to impact care through
either quantity restrictions or prices – that is, if insurer bargaining effects
dominate. Changes in insurer composition could also change the bargaining
dynamic or prices paid. Expansions in Medicaid or subsidized CommCare
plans might lead to relatively different payment incentives. Length of stay
may also decline if insurance alters treatment decisions, potentially allowing
substitution between inpatient and outpatient care or drugs that would not
have been feasible without coverage.16 To investigate these two effects, we
estimate models of length of stay following equation (1) in both levels and
logs of the dependent variable.
The results in specifications 8 and 9 of Table 1 show that length of stay
decreased by 0.05 days on a base of 5.42 days in the levels specification –
a decline of approximately 1 percent. Estimates in column 2 show a 0.12
percent decline in the specification in logs. Because taking logs increases
the weight on shorter stays, this difference suggests that the reform had
a larger impact on longer stays. In unreported results, we also estimate
models of the probability a patient exceeds specific length of stay cutoffs.
16Discussions with physicians suggest that a key challenge in discharging a patient from
the hospital is determining the availability and quality of follow up care (e.g. access to
a primary care physician for a follow up visit, support to pick up and take prescribed
medicines or space in skilled nursing or long term care facility). Insurance potentially
plays an important role in this transition. In the absence of follow up care physicians may
keep patients in the inpatient setting despite potentially much more efficient settings in
which their care could be provided.
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The results validate the findings in columns 1 and 2. Patients were roughly
10 percent less likely to stay beyond 13 and/or 30 days in Massachusetts after
the reform. These effects were statistically significant. The probabilities of
staying beyond shorter cutoffs (2, 5, and 9 days) were unchanged. The
results suggest that patients were significantly more likely to stay at least 3
days though the magnitude of the coefficient suggests an increase of only 1
percent relative to the baseline share.
To address the concern that our estimated reduction in length of stay was
driven by differential selection of healthier patients into the hospital after the
reform in MA, we report results controlling for risk adjustment variables in
the last row of both panels in Table 1. The estimated decreases in length
of stay and log length of stay are at least twice as large in the specifications
that include risk adjusters. Holding the makeup of the patient pool constant,
length of stay clearly declined. The comparison between the baseline and
risk-adjusted results suggests that, patients requiring longer length of stays
selected into the patient pool in post-reform Massachusetts.
One plausible mechanism for the decline in length of stay is limited hos-
pital capacity. As with patient severity, capacity constraints are interesting
in their own right, but they could bias our estimates of other reform impacts.
Capacity itself is endogenous and may have changed with the reform, as we
saw in the model with number of beds as the dependent variable.17
Our results can provide some insight into whether changes in length of
stay seem to be related to capacity by comparing the additional capacity
that resulted from the decrease in length of stay to the magnitude of the
change in discharges. Because hospitals care about total changes in capacity,
not just among the nonelderly, we use estimates for the change in length of
stay among the entire population, a decrease of .06 days on a base of 5.88
days. The new, lower average length of stay is 5.88− 0.06 = 5.82 days. This
17In a simple queuing model of hospital demand and bed size, Joskow (1980) shows
that, under general assumptions, the probability that a patient is turned away from a
hospital is endogenously determined by the hospital when it selects a reserve ratio (the
difference between the total number of beds and the average daily census (ADC) relative
to the standard deviation in arrival rates). Because beds are a fixed cost, capacity and
utilization are a source of scale economies for hospitals. If hospitals seek to improve
efficiency we would expect to see improved throughput in an effort to lower cost. One
means of accomplishing this is to make smaller increases in capacity relative to demand
following the reform.
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would make room for an extra (0.06 ∗ 5, 616)/(5.88 − 0.06) = 58 discharges.
An extra 58 discharges exceeds the estimated increase of 19 discharges (from
column 1 of Table 2). We note, however, that the upper bound of the 95
percent confidence interval for the estimated change in total discharges is
greater than 58. Thus, decreased length of stay could have been a response
to increased supply side constraints, although this explanation would be more
convincing if the point estimate for the change in the number of discharges
were positive and closer to change in the supply-side constraint of 58.18
4.2.3. Impact on Access and Preventive Care
One potentially important role of insurance is to reduce the cost of obtain-
ing preventive care that can improve health and/or reduce future inpatient
expenditures. In this case, moral hazard can be dynamically efficient by in-
creasing up front care that results in future cost reductions (Chernew et al.
(2007)). One manifestation of a lack of coverage that has received substantial
attention is the use of the emergency room (ER) as a provider of last resort.
If people do not have a regular point of access to the health care system and,
instead, go to the emergency room only when they become sufficiently sick,
such behavior can lead them to forego preventive care and potentially in-
crease the cost of future treatment. In addition, emergency room care could
be ceteris paribus more expensive to provide than primary care because of
the cost of operating an ER relative to other outpatient settings. Although
we do not observe all emergency room discharges, we can examine inpatient
admissions from the emergency room as a rough measure of emergency room
usage. A decrease in admissions from the ER after the reform is evidence that
a subset of the population that previously accessed inpatient care through the
emergency room accessed inpatient care through a traditional primary care
channel or avoided inpatient care entirely (perhaps by obtaining outpatient
care).
In specification 10 of Table 1, we examine the impact of the reform on
discharges for which the emergency room was the source of admission. We
see that the reform resulted in a 2.02 percentage point reduction in the frac-
tion of admissions from the emergency room. Relative to an initial mean
in Massachusetts of 38.7 percent this estimate represents a decline in in-
18Although we do not find much evidence for capacity constraints in the inpatient set-
ting, there is anecdotal evidence for capacity constraints in the outpatient primary care
setting. Investigating constraints in that setting is beyond the scope of this paper.
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patient admissions originating in the emergency room of 5.2 percent. The
risk-adjusted estimate reported in the bottom row of specification 10 is very
similar.19
As a further specification check, we decompose the effect by zip code
income quartile.20 To the extent that income is a proxy for ex ante coverage
levels, we expect larger declines in inpatient admissions originating in the
ER among relatively poorer populations. We present these results in Table
5. We find that the reduction in emergency admissions was particularly
pronounced among people from zip codes in the lowest income quartile. As
reported in the second panel of Table 5, the coefficient estimate suggests a
12.2 (= -0.0570/.4665) percent reduction (significant at the 1 percent level)
in inpatient admissions from the emergency room. The effect in the top
two income quartiles, on the other hand, is not statistically significantly
different from zero (coefficient estimate of -0.0107 and 0.0098 for the 3rd
and 4th income quartiles respectively). Taken together, these results suggest
that the reform did reduce use of the ER as a point of entry into inpatient
care. This effect was driven by expanded coverage, particularly among lower
income populations.
Our results focus solely on emergency room visits that resulted in a hos-
pitalization. This group should be of particular interest to economists and
policy makers. They are relatively sick since an admission was ultimately
deemed necessary, and would likely benefit from access to outpatient or other
care. Furthermore, this is likely to be a much higher cost group where im-
provements in access may yield efficiency gains. Nevertheless, many ER visits
19We note that these results differ somewhat from discussions in media and policy circles
(Kowalczyk (2010)). Our analysis differs for a few reasons. First, we are focused solely on
inpatient admissions from the ER. While this limits the scope of our results, it allows us to
focus on a population of particular importance, the relatively sick and costly populations
who, ultimately, receive care in the hospital. A second issue with the existing discussion of
Massachusetts ER usage is the lack of a control group. Our results take into account trends
in ER usage nationwide that are likely to be changing over time. Using this approach,
we are better able to account for changes in ER usage unrelated to the reform that affect
MA, though we note that our findings do not appear to be driven by differential trends in
states other than Massachusetts (see Figure 2).
20In results not shown, we decompose the effect by race, gender and income, and age.
The results are not shown here in an effort to conserve space, but they are available in
Kolstad and Kowalski (2010) Additionally, we present an analog to Table 5 using CPS
data can be found in Appendix Table A2
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do not result in admission to the hospital. In subsequent work, Miller (2011)
studies the universe of ER visits in Massachusetts directly. Her study is a
useful complement to our results on this question. She finds reductions in ER
admissions, primarily for preventable and deferrable conditions that would
not result in inpatient admissions.
In addition to the use of the ER, we are interested in measuring whether
providing health insurance directly affects access to and use of preventive
care. To investigate the impact of the reform on prevention we use a set
of measures developed by the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality
(AHRQ): the prevention quality indicators (PQIs).21 See Appendix D for
more details on these measures. These measures were developed as a means
to measure the quality of outpatient care using inpatient data, which are
more readily available. The appearance of certain preventable conditions in
the inpatient setting, such as appendicitis that results in perforation of the
appendix, or diabetes that results in lower extremity amputation, is evidence
that adequate outpatient care was not obtained. All of the prevention quality
measures are indicator variables that indicate the presence of a diagnosis
that should not be observed in inpatient data if adequate outpatient care
was obtained.
One concern in using these measures over a relatively narrow window
of time is that we might not expect to see any impact of prevention on
inpatient admissions. However, validating these measures with physicians
suggest that the existence of PQI admissions is likely due to short term
management of disease in an outpatient setting (e.g. cleaning and treating
diabetic foot ulcers to avoid amputations due to gangrene), that we expect
would be manifest within the post-reform period.22 Interpreted with different
emphasis, these measures also capture impacts on health through averted
hospitalizations. We run our difference-and-difference estimator separately
for each quality measure using the binary numerator as the outcome variable,
and the denominator to select the sample.
Table 3 presents regression results for each of the prevention quality in-
dicators. Each regression is a separate row of the table. In the first row,
the outcome is the “Overall PQI” measure suggested by AHRQ – a dummy
21We thank Carlos Dobkin for suggesting the use of these indicators.
22We thank Dr. Katrina Abuabara for discussing each of these PQI measures and the
associated treatment regime and potential for inpatient admission.
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variable that indicates the presence of any of the prevention quality indica-
tors on a specific discharge. PQI 02 is excluded from this measure because
it has a different denominator. We find little overall effect in the base speci-
fication. One advantage of examining this measure relative to the individual
component measures is that doing so mitigates concerns about multiple hy-
pothesis testing. The following rows show that of the 13 individual PQI
measures, 3 exhibit a statistically significant decrease, 9 exhibit no statis-
tically significant change, and 1 exhibits a statistically significant increase.
Taken together, these results suggest that there may have been small im-
pacts on preventive care, but little overall effect in reducing the number of
preventable admissions.
We also estimate the model including controls for severity. If the impact
of insurance or outpatient care on the existence of a PQI varies in patient
severity, it is possible that the small estimated effects mask a compositional
effect of the inpatient population after the reform. That is, if relatively se-
vere patients are more likely to be hospitalized with a PQI, regardless of the
outpatient care they receive, then estimates that hold the patient population
fixed provide a better estimate for the impact of the reform on preventive
care. These results are presented in the second column of Table 3. For the
overall PQI measure, the coefficient on MA∗After is -0.0023 and is statisti-
cally significant at the 1 percent level. Compared to the baseline rate of PQIs,
this corresponds to a decline of 2.7 percent in preventable admissions. Re-
sults for the individual measures tell a similar story. Taken together, these
results suggest that there was a small overall effect of the reform on pre-
ventable admissions but, holding the severity of the population fixed, there
were significant declines. We find that, if anything, the inpatient popula-
tion was more severe after the reform. Thus comparing the two coefficients
both with and without risk adjustment suggests that the effect of the reform
on reducing preventable admissions was largest among relatively less severe
patients.
To supplement our analysis of preventive care, we also estimate models of
prevention using data from the BRFSS for years 2004-2009. The BRFSS is a
state-based system of health surveys that collects information on health risk
behaviors, preventive practices, and health care access. For more information
on the BRFSS, see Appendix E. Table 4 column 1 presents the differences-
in-differences estimate for the impact of reform on those reporting they have
health insurance coverage. Consistent with the results from the CPS, we
a roughly 5 percent increase in coverage after the reform relative to before
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the reform in Massachusetts relative to other states. The remaining seven
columns present results that are relevant to outpatient and preventive care.
In column 2, we see a significant increase of 1.26 percent in individuals re-
porting they had a personal doctor. The reform also led to a decrease of 3.06
percentage points in individuals reporting they could not access care due to
cost. Columns 4-8 present difference-in-differences estimates for the impact
of the reform on a set of direct measures of preventive care. We find little
overall impact in the population. The only statistically significant estimate
is for the impact of the reform on receiving a flu vaccination.
4.2.4. Impact on Hospital Costs
In this section, we investigate the impact of the reform on hospital costs.
The cost impact, as we discuss above, depends on the relative changes in
incentives facing hospitals and physicians in treatment and investment de-
cisions. In the presence of moral hazard or income effects, we expect that
the large coverage expansion in Massachusetts would lead the newly insured
to seek additional care and, conditional on use, more expensive care (Pauly
(1968); Manning et al. (1987); Kowalski (2009)). Insurers are also able to
negotiate lower prices for care and, in the case of managed care plans, address
treatment decisions directly through quantity limits (i.e. prior authorization
rules that require a physician to get approval from the insurer in order for a
procedure to be reimbursed, etc.) (Cutler et al. (2000)). Increased coverage
through Medicaid or other insurers with relatively low reimbursement could
mute the incentives for the provision of costly care. Furthermore, insurance
could alter the way hospital care is produced making transitions in care eas-
ier or facilitating substitution of treatments to lower cost, outpatient settings
or drugs. Thus, increases in coverage could lead to a countervailing decrease
in cost with insurance coverage. Consequently, it is an empirical question
whether increases in health insurance coverage among the hospitalized pop-
ulation will raise or lower cost.
To measure hospital costs directly, we obtained hospital level all-payer
cost to charge ratios. Hospitals are required to report these ratios to Medi-
care on an annual basis. The numerator of the ratio represents the annual
total costs of operating the hospital such as overhead costs, salaries, and
equipment. Costs only include the portion of hospital operations for in-
patient care; they do not include the cost of uncompensated care, which
presumably declined with the increase in insurance coverage. The denomi-
nator of this ratio represents annual total charges across all payers, which we
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observe disaggregated by discharge in the NIS. With our information on total
charges from the NIS, we can get an accurate measure of total costs at the
hospital level. Several papers in the economics literature measure total costs
at the discharge level by deflating total charges by the cost to charge ratio
(see Almond et al. (2010)). However, since there is no variation in observed
costs at a level finer than the hospital level, estimating such a regression
requires the strong assumption that the ratio of costs to charges is the same
for all discharges within the hospital. Since we are interested in hospital-level
costs, we need not impose this assumption, and we can focus on results at
the hospital level.
The bottom panel of Table 2 presents difference-in-differences estimates
for the impact of the reform on hospital costs using a variety of specifica-
tions. The first column presents estimates in levels. The coefficient estimate
of 4.17 is statistically significantly different from zero. The logarithmic spec-
ification in column 2 yields a negative estimate for the impact of the reform
on cost, though the coefficient is insignificant. The difference between the
two, can be explained by the fact that the logarithmic specification takes into
account trends in growth for both treatment and control groups. That is,
Massachusetts had a differential trend in cost growth relative to the rest of
the country before the reform. The log specification results indicate that this
trend was not altered by the expansion in coverage relative to trends before
and after the reform in the remainder of the country. The plots in Figure 4,
which depict cost trends in Massachusetts and other states for the outcomes
in Table 2, show that Massachusetts had a higher rate of cost growth as
compared to other states before the reform. After the reform, Massachusetts
relative costs appear to be in line with their pre-reform trend.
In the next columns, and in the bottom plots in Figure 4, we model cost
per day and discharge, to account for changes in cost that may be due to
changes in the intensity or total volume of patients treated. Both results are
consistent with the levels regression in column 1 and suggest that cost growth
was largely unchanged by the expansion in coverage in Massachusetts. Taken
together, our results suggest that the Massachusetts reform did not increase
the cost of hospital care relative to the baseline trend in cost growth. Thus,
the Massachusetts reform did not appear to “bend the cost curve” upward
or downward.
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5. Implications for National Reform
While the impact of Massachusetts reform is of intrinsic interest, our
results are also of broader interest given the similarities between the Mas-
sachusetts reform and the national reform. Without far more stringent mod-
eling assumptions, it is difficult to predict the impact of coverage expansions
at the national level. Nevertheless, our results do provide some broad pre-
dictions for national reform.
We find that the policy tools employed in Massachusetts expanded cover-
age among the previously uninsured. In the overall population, roughly half
of new coverage was from private sources and the other half was from sub-
sidized sources. Within the hospitalized population, we find some evidence
for crowd-out of private coverage by subsidized coverage. The magnitude of
the coverage increase under national reform could differ because several pol-
icy parameters, such as subsidies and penalties, have different magnitudes.
Under national reform, the Congressional Budget Office predicts a reduction
in uninsurance of 30 million people or roughly 8.4 percentage points (Con-
gressional Budget Office (2012)). This estimate, along with the Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid Services estimate of 7.1 percentage points (Truffer
et al. (2010)), is slightly larger than reduction in coverage we find in Mas-
sachusetts, but they are of a comparable magnitude, suggesting extrapolating
our broad findings is reasonable.
Subject to the caveat that some specific features of the Massachusetts ex-
perience that might make our results less valid in predicting the impact of the
national reform, our results suggest that the national reform will likely result
in reductions in length of stay, fewer preventable admissions, and fewer ad-
missions from the emergency room. In Massachusetts, declines in admissions
from the emergency room are largest among those with the lowest incomes,
but Massachusetts is a wealthy state. To the extent that larger and poorer
states have a greater share of the population at lower income levels, the im-
pact on ER utilization could be even larger. However, some of our results
could be specific to the hospital market in Massachusetts. Massachusetts,
particularly the Boston area, has many large, prestigious medical centers.
It is also a relatively concentrated hospital market. Additional coverage or
changes in insurer market power might have different effects in other settings.
We find that the Massachusetts reform did not lower hospital cost growth
in the aggregate. However, cost impacts are likely to be different under na-
tional reform. Massachusetts financed health reform largely through the
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reallocation of money already allocated for specific programs like the uncom-
pensated care pool and DSH payments. The national reform also includes
changes in Medicare financing that could affect incentives at the hospital
level. These changes include payment reductions for Medicare Advantage
and the introduction of new payment models including bundled payments
and Accountable Care Organizations. The latter provides potentially very
different incentives for care delivery because it provides incentives for primary
care doctors to lower cost.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we show that the Massachusetts health insurance reform ex-
panded coverage among the inpatient hospital population by approximately
36 percent relative to its pre-reform level. Among this population, we see
some evidence of the crowd-out of private coverage by subsidized coverage,
but we do not find evidence for crowd-out in the general population, sug-
gesting that the incidence of crowd-out differs by health status.
This paper is the first to examine the effect of Massachusetts health in-
surance reform on hospital outcomes. We show declines in length of stay
and admissions from the emergency room following the reform. Our results,
while sensitive to the inclusion of controls for patient severity, also suggest
that prevention increased outside of hospitals, resulting in a decline in inpa-
tient admissions for certain preventable conditions, reflecting a likely health
impact for individuals susceptible to these conditions. In the midst of these
gains, we find no evidence that hospital cost growth increased. We are unable
to make precise welfare statements as we do not capture increased costs to
the government and to the purchasers of health insurance that resulted from
the reform. As our research progresses, we aim to answer other economics
questions using variation by health insurance reform in Massachusetts.
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Appendix A. Block Bootstrap
Since our main identifying variation is at the state-time level, we follow
Bertrand et al. (2004), and block bootstrap our confidence intervals by state.
Doing so allows for an arbitrary variance-covariance matrix within states
across time. In this section, we discuss some implementation details that
are not discussed by Bertrand et al. (2004). First, the empirical simulation
results using the CPS presented by Bertrand et al. (2004) assume that half
of the states are treated and the other half are untreated. Since we have
only one treated state, it is only sampled in approximately one third of block
bootstrap draws. In these draws, the difference-in-differences coefficient on
MA∗After cannot be estimated. In practice, we include these replications
in the bootstrap sample to estimate the confidence intervals on the other
coefficients without bias. We use a large number of bootstrap replications –
1,000 – so that the confidence intervals on our coefficient of interest are still
based on a large number of bootstrap replications.23
Second, all of our regressions are weighted. To address weighting within
our block bootstrap procedure, we sample states with replacement. Within a
state, the sum of the weights does not change because all observations from a
given state are drawn at once. However, the sum of the weights varies across
regressions because not all states are sampled and some states are sampled
more than once.
Appendix B. Robustness of Insurance Results
One potential concern about the external validity of our results is that
Massachusetts could differ from the remainder of the country in ways that
we do not observe, and these differences could lead to changes in coverage at
23Difficulties in the block bootstrap procedure aside, we acknowledge that having only
one treated state potentially limits the external validity of our results. To address this
limitation, we consider level and trend differences between MA and other states, which we
discuss in Section 4.1.1.
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the same time that the reform was implemented. Such differences could be
due, for example, to factors that affected the entire Northeast. Alternately, it
could be due to factors that affected states with relatively low levels of unin-
surance. To account for potential unobserved differences that are correlated
with observed differences in uninsurance, we estimate a series of specifica-
tions in our nonelderly sample, in which we restrict the comparison groups to
states most similar to Massachusetts. We present these results in Appendix
Table 7.
We first examine changes in uninsurance. When we restrict the compar-
ison group of hospitals to hospitals in the Northeast Census division in the
second panel, the impact of the reform on uninsurance is smaller than it is in
the preferred specification, reproduced in the first panel. As reported in the
means at the bottom of the column, the initial level of insurance coverage
in the comparison states in the Northeast Census division was similar to the
initial level of insurance coverage in the comparison states in the national
sample. Similarly, in the third panel, when we restrict the comparison group
to include only New England states, which had an initial lower but not statis-
tically lower rate of uninsurance than Massachusetts, the estimated impact
of the reform falls to a 1.59 percentage point reduction in uninsurance. This
is statistically smaller than the baseline effect, but it remains significantly
different from zero at the 1 percent level despite the much smaller sample
size. To investigate the possibility that this change in magnitude is due to
the limited health reforms that occurred in 2006 in Maine, Vermont and
San Francisco, California, in column 4, we estimate the main specification
in the full sample but we exclude Maine, Vermont, and California. Reas-
suringly, our point estimate remains unchanged from our main specification.
As an alternative specification check, we estimate the same specification on
the sample of the 25 states with the highest levels of nonelderly insurance
coverage before the reform in the CPS. Our point estimate is not statistically
different from that in the main specification.
In the remaining columns of Appendix Table A4, we present similar spec-
ifications for each of our main outcomes of interest. In general, our quanti-
tative conclusions as well as our qualitative conclusions are unchanged when
we change the group of comparison states. Our emergency admission result
is particularly robust.
An additional issue in extrapolating from our Massachusetts results is
that Massachusetts had a relatively smaller potential increase in insurance
due to its high baseline level. If the cost of expanding coverage is convex, we
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expect larger reductions in uninsurance from the same policies in locations
with higher baseline levels of uninsurance. We could test this proposition if
another state with a different baseline level of uninsurance enacted the same
policies. In the absence of such a natural experiment, we look for suggestive
evidence in support of this hypothesis by examining the effect of the reform
by baseline levels of insurance coverage within Massachusetts on the hospital
level.
In Appendix Table A5, we divide hospitals based on their initial level of
insurance coverage in the pre-reform period. Because not all hospitals in the
sample were in the pre-reform data, we first restrict the sample to hospitals
that appear at least once in the sample in the Before period. These results are
presented in the second panel. Estimating the average impact of the reform
in this subsample, we find that impact of the reform remained virtually
unchanged, 1.52 percentage points compared to 1.53. We then divide the
sample into two groups based on whether the hospital had below- or above-
median levels of uninsurance in the Before period. Among Massachusetts
hospitals in the sample in the Before period, 29 hospitals had uninsurance
below the national median, and the remaining 11 hospitals had uninsurance
above the national median. We are able to estimate statistically significant
impacts on uninsurance in both groups of hospitals, but estimates based on
hospitals with below-median uninsurance are more precise.
Estimates from the first column of the third and fourth panels show that
the impact of the reform was statistically indistinguishable in hospitals with
lower initial rates of uninsurance (a 1.78 percentage point increase in cover-
age) and hospitals with higher initial rates of uninsurance (a 1.65 percentage
point increase in coverage). Although we might have expected that convex
cost of coverage expansion would have led to greater reductions in uninsur-
ance in hospitals with initially higher rates of uninsurance, the results are
not statistically different from each other. As shown in the second to fourth
columns, impacts on length of stay and admissions from the ER were also
similar across both groups of hospitals. Without recovering the structural
parameters that determine the cost of coverage expansion it is difficult to
make precise out of sample predictions. However, these findings suggest the
results we find in Massachusetts, which had lower initial uninsurance than
other states, could be similar to the impact of the national reform.
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Appendix C. Risk Adjustment
Selection into hospitals after the reform in Massachusetts is an outcome
of interest in its own right, which we address as a complement to our analysis,
but to examine causal changes in other outcomes, we control for character-
istics of the patient pool. To do so, we use six24 sets of risk adjustment vari-
ables: demographic characteristics, the number of diagnoses on the discharge
record, individual components of the Charlson Score measure of comorbidi-
ties, AHRQ comorbidity measures, All-Patient Refined Diagnosis Related
Groups (APR-DRGs), and All-Payer Severity-adjusted (APS-DRGs). Each
risk adjustment measure was developed with a slightly different purpose, but
the correlation among them is high. Since our focus is on controlling for
selection and not on investigating the relative merit of each measure, we in-
clude all risk adjustment variables in the same specification. We run all of
our regressions on the discharge level, as opposed to the hospital level, to
capture the interactions between measures on the discharge level.
We construct the first four measures ourselves from the information in
the discharge records. First, we include the same demographic measures
that we include in specification 3 of Table 1 – saturated controls in race,
gender, and income, as well as age and age squared. Second, following Gruber
and Kleiner (2010), we control for the number of diagnoses on the hospital
discharge record. The number of diagnoses in our nonelderly sample varies
from 0 to 15, the average is 5, and the maximum potentially reported is 15.
Third, using data on the composition of diagnoses, we calculate and control
for the individual components of the Charlson Score.25 The Charlson score,
which includes 18 components, has been shown to have a strong relationship
with mortality (Quan et al. (2005)). The average number of components in
our nonelderly data is 0.37, and the maximum is 9. Fourth, we control for
the 29 AHRQ comorbidity measures. The nonelderly mean in our data is 1
and the maximum is 14.
The remaining two measures were constructed in our data using propri-
24In Kolstad and Kowalski (2010), we included a seventh set of risk adjusters, Medstat
disease staging measures, but we must omit them here because they are no longer available
in 2008.
25See Charlson et al. (1987) for the origin of the Charlson Score measures. We draw
our Charlson Score code from http://healthservices.cancer.gov/seermedicare/
program/charlson.comorbidity.macro.txt.
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etary algorithms. The APR-DRG measures and the APS-DRG measures, de-
veloped by 3M, were developed as refinements to the existing Refined DRGs
(R-DRGs) and All-Patient DRGs (AP-DRGs) systems, which expanded the
DRG system beyond the Medicare population. The APR-DRG and APS-
DRG measures include further adjustments for severity and for neonatal dis-
charges. There are two separate APR-DRG measures: a mortality-specific
measure and a general severity measure. We include both measures in each
specification. The mortality measure takes on integer values from 0 to 4 with
a mean in our data of 1.3, and the severity measure takes on the same values
with a mean of 1.7.
There are three APS-DRG measures: one charge-specific measure, one
length of stay-specific measure, and one mortality-specific measure. Each
outcome-specific APS-DRG measure was developed using the 2000 NIS data,
and is standardized to have a mean of 1 in that sample (HSS, Inc. (2003)).
Multiplying the outcome-specific measure by the mean of that outcome in
the 2000 NIS gives a prediction of the expected value of that outcome. For
example, the mean charge in the 2000 NIS was $13,241.41, and the largest
value of the charge-specific APS-DRG for a discharge in our nonelderly sam-
ple was 26.21, so predicted charges for that discharge would be $347,057 in
the year 2000. To interpret the other magnitudes, the mean LOS in the 2000
NIS was 4.5096, and mean mortality in the 2000 NIS was 0.0247 deaths per
discharge. In our sample including all ages, the means of each measure are
slightly greater than the standardized value of 1.0, reflecting real changes in
since the year 2000 and sampling changes from the 2000 NIS to 2004-2007
NIS. The charges measure takes on values from 0.09 to 26.21, with a mean
of 0.88 in the nonelderly sample; the length of stay measure takes on values
from 0.21 to 19.02, with a mean of 0.93 in the nonelderly sample; and the
mortality measure takes on values from 0 to 46.74, with a mean of 0.69 in the
nonelderly sample. We include all three measures in each specification. The
second specification of Appendix Table A3 reports the coefficients on all risk
adjustment variables in the risk-adjusted uninsurance regression reported in
the last row of the first specification in Table 1.
Appendix D. Prevention Quality Indicators
We use software from AHRQ to calculate these measures in our NIS
data (Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (2007a)). We use the
December 2009 Version 4.1 of the Prevention Quality Indicators (Agency
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for Healthcare Research and Quality (2007b)), the most recent version that
does not include a windows executable file. The calculation of each one of
these quality indicators is often based on a complicated algorithm because
the diagnosis first needs to be identified, and then specific discharges must
be excluded based on secondary diagnoses and risk factors that mitigate
the potential for prevention. Each quality measure includes a numerator, a
specific condition, and a denominator, the population at risk for this specific
condition, which sometimes represents the entire population in a geographic
area. The presence of the numerator and denominator allows a researcher
to calculate rates with data for a single hospital. Since our research design
compares hospitals to each other and to themselves over time, we do not
calculate any of the measures as rates. Instead, we use a dummy dependent
variable to indicate inclusion in the numerator – the presence of a quality
measure on a specific discharge. For each quality measure, we restrict the
sample to discharges included in the denominator.
Appendix E. Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS)
The BRFSS is a cross-sectional telephone survey conducted by state
health departments on a monthly basis with technical and methodological
assistance provided by the Centers for Disease Control (CDC). Sampling fol-
lows a multistage design based on random-digit-dialing in order to select a
representative sample from the non-institutionalized adult population in each
state and territory. Our sample from BRFSS data contain 2,293,672 obser-
vations; in the analysis, data are weighted for the probability of selection of
a telephone number, the number of adults in a household, and the number
of telephones in a household; post-stratification adjustments are also made
for non-response and non-coverage of households without telephones.
Appendix F. Comparison of NIS Hospital Sample to the Universe
of Hospitals in Massachusetts
One important question in evaluating our results is the degree to which
the NIS hospital sample is reflective of the actual distribution of hospitals in
Massachusetts. To address this issue, we obtained the detailed data on the
universe of hospitals in the state of Massachusetts from the Massachusetts
Department of Health Care Finance and Policy. Appendix Table A6 presents
a comparison of the hospitals in the two samples in 2008, the most recent year
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of our data. The comparison of means across the two samples demonstrates
clearly the similarities between the two. The NIS sample appears to have
more large hospitals than the universe though the average number of beds is
relatively similar. The composition by for-profit and not-for-profit status in
the NIS appears to be highly representative of the universe of discharges, as
are most of the variables. This comparison makes clear that while the NIS
is a sample intended to be nationally representative, in Massachusetts, the
discharges included in the NIS are very reflective of the universe of discharges
in our sample period.
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Figure 1: Mean Coverage Rates by Year
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Source: 2004-2009 Supplements to the Current Population Survey, authors’ calculations.  Vertical lines 
separate During and After periods.  
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Figure 2: Trends in MA vs. Non-MA
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Figure 3: Trends in MA vs. Non-MA, Hospital Quarter Level
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Figure 4: Trends in MA vs. Non-MA, Hospital Quarter Level
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Table A4: Robustness to Included States in NIS
Robustness to Included States in NIS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Uninsured Length of Stay Log Length of Stay Emergency Admit
All States
MA*After -0.0231 -0.0504 -0.0012 -0.0202
[-0.0300,-0.0162]*** [-0.0999,-0.0008]** [-0.0111,0.0086] [-0.0397,-0.0007]**
N (Nonelderly) 23,860,930 23,913,183 23,913,183 23,913,983
Mean MA Before 0.0643 5.4256 1.4267 0.3868
Mean Non-MA Before 0.0791 5.0770 1.3552 0.3591
Mean MA After 0.0352 5.3717 1.4355 0.4058
Mean Non-MA After 0.0817 5.0958 1.3596 0.3745
Northeast
MA*After -0.0160 -0.0293 -0.0070 -0.0293
[-0.0309,-0.0011]** [-0.2007,0.1421] [-0.0551,0.0411] [-0.0500,-0.0085]**
N (Nonelderly) 4,510,280 4,511,992 4,511,992 4,512,094
Mean Non-MA Before 0.0790 5.6529 1.4163 0.4281
Mean Non-MA After 0.0613 5.6453 1.4203 0.4425
New England
MA*After -0.0159 -0.0021 0.0170 -0.0411
[-0.0193,-0.0125]*** [-0.1276,0.1233] [-0.0214,0.0554] [-0.0749,-0.0072]**
N (Nonelderly) 1,369,181 1,370,420 1,370,420 1,370,438
Mean Non-MA Before 0.0450 5.3462 1.3890 0.3337
Mean Non-MA After 0.0408 5.3576 1.3840 0.3324
All, No ME, VT, CA
MA*After -0.0236 -0.0537 -0.0022 -0.0202
[-0.0311,-0.0161]*** [-0.1082,0.0008]* [-0.0129,0.0085] [-0.0417,0.0013]*
N (Nonelderly) 21,067,733 21,119,253 21,119,253 21,119,708
Mean Non-MA Before 0.0837 5.0926 1.3606 0.3653
Mean Non-MA After 0.0871 5.0996 1.3644 0.3813
25 Most Insured
MA*After -0.0246 -0.0477 0.0056 -0.0066
[-0.0367,-0.0126]*** [-0.0817,-0.0138]*** [-0.0012,0.0124] [-0.0623,0.0491]
N (Nonelderly) 8,028,553 8,057,249 8,057,249 8,057,439
Mean Non-MA Before 0.0595 4.9274 1.3424 0.3300
Mean Non-MA After 0.0638 4.9342 1.3438 0.3426
Balanced Panel (Only Hospitals That Appear in Data in Every Possible Quarter)
MA*After -0.0273 0.1087 0.0297 0.0244
[-0.0500,-0.0045]** [-0.0872,0.3045] [-0.0038,0.0633]* [-0.0705,0.1193]
N (Nonelderly) 768,541 770,696 770,696 770,699
Mean MA Before 0.0461 5.4089 1.4104 0.4701
Mean Non-MA Before 0.0714 4.6790 1.3037 0.2769
Mean MA After 0.0279 5.4701 1.4323 0.4902
Mean Non-MA After 0.0800 4.6364 1.2969 0.2720
95% asymptotic CI clustered by state: *** Significant at .01, ** Significant at .05, * Significant at .10
MA*During included but coefficient not reported.  
All specifications and means weighted using discharge weights.
All specifications include hospital fixed effects and time fixed effects for 2004 to 2008, quarterly.
"All States" sample includes all states in the 2004-2008 NIS.  Does not include AL, AK, DE, ID, MS, MT, ND, NM.  
"New England" sample includes MA, CT, NH, VT, ME, RI.  "Northeast" sample includes New England, NY, NJ.
"25 Most Insured" includes the top half of states in terms of initial levels of insurance from the CPS.  
Source: HCUP NIS 2004-2008 authors' calculations.  See text for more details.
In decreasing order of insurance, "25 Most Insured" includes: MN, HI, IA, NH, ME, WI, MA, VT, KS, RI, NE, MI, ND (not in 
NIS), CT, PA, OH, M0, SD, DE (not in NIS), VA, MD, TN, KY, UT.
"Balanced Panel" only includes states that appear in every possible quarter of the data.  These hospitals are in AZ (2), CA, 
CO (2), GA, MA (2), MD, MN, NC, NE, OH, TN, TX (4), UT, WA (4), WV (2). 
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Table A5: Insurance and Outcomes in Low vs. High Uninsured Hospitals in
NIS
Insurance and Outcomes in Low vs. High Uninsured Hospitals in NIS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Uninsured Length of Stay Log Length of Stay Emergency Admit
All Hospitals (100% of sample, including missing ages)
Ma*After -0.0153 -0.0626 0.0006 -0.0367
[-0.0201,-0.0104]*** [-0.1102,-0.0150]** [-0.0090,0.0103] [-0.0585,-0.0149]***
N (All Ages) 36,282,073 36,343,449 36,343,449 36,345,238
N Hospitals 3,090 3,090 3,090 3,090
N Hospitals in MA 48 48 48 48
Mean MA Before 0.0409 5.8833 1.5099 0.4789
Mean Non-MA Before 0.0543 5.6256 1.4517 0.4291
Mean MA After 0.0226 5.7516 1.5084 0.4912
Mean Non-MA After 0.0557 5.5819 1.4482 0.4491
Only Hospitals that Appear in Data At Least Once Before Reform
Ma*After -0.0152 -0.0651 -0.0001 -0.0369
[-0.0202,-0.0102]*** [-0.1155,-0.0147]** [-0.0104,0.0102] [-0.0596,-0.0143]***
N (All Ages) 30,390,240 30,441,321 30,441,321 30,442,760
N Hospitals 2,315 2,315 2,315 2,315
N Hospitals in MA 40 40 40 40
Mean MA Before 0.0409 5.8833 1.5099 0.4789
Mean Non-MA Before 0.0543 5.6256 1.4517 0.4291
Mean MA After 0.0230 5.7678 1.5085 0.4856
Mean Non-MA After 0.0595 5.5803 1.4460 0.4473
Low Uninsured Hospitals
Ma*After -0.0178 -0.0895 0.0019 -0.0409
[-0.0228,-0.0129]*** [-0.1522,-0.0269]*** [-0.0074,0.0112] [-0.0577,-0.0241]***
N (All Ages) 14,407,631 14,426,624 14,426,624 14,427,194
N Hospitals 1,157 1,157 1,157 1,157
N Hospitals in MA 29 29 29 29
Mean MA Before 0.0303 5.8769 1.5058 0.4431
Mean Non-MA Before 0.0210 5.6142 1.4487 0.4087
Mean MA After 0.0220 5.7938 1.5119 0.4742
Mean Non-MA After 0.0295 5.6036 1.4438 0.4306
High Uninsured Hospitals
Ma*After -0.0165 -0.0260 -0.0063 -0.0086
[-0.0246,-0.0085]*** [-0.0782,0.0263] [-0.0151,0.0024] [-0.0312,0.0140]
N (All Ages) 15,982,609 16,015,279 16,015,279 16,016,149
N Hospitals 1,158 1,158 1,158 1,158
N Hospitals in MA 11 11 11 11
Mean MA Before 0.0635 5.8969 1.5186 0.5550
Mean Non-MA Before 0.0848 5.6360 1.4546 0.4478
Mean MA After 0.0314 5.5593 1.4808 0.5769
Mean Non-MA After 0.0845 5.5609 1.4478 0.4612
95% asymptotic CI clustered by state: *** Significant at .01, ** Significant at .05, * Significant at .10
MA*During included but coefficient not reported.  
All specifications and means weighted using discharge weights.
All specifications include hospital fixed effects and time fixed effects for 2004 to 2008, quarterly.
Low Uninsured Hospitals have less than median uninsurance of 0.0398 before reform.
Sample sizes vary across specifications based on availability of dependent variable.  
Source: HCUP NIS 2004-2008 authors' calculations.  See text for more details.53
Table A6: Comparison of Massachusetts Hospital Characteristics in the NIS
HCUP and Casemix Datasets, AHA Data 2008
Acute Care 
Hospitals (Casemix 
Dataset)
NIS-HCUP Hospitals
[n=64] [n=15]
% Teaching hospitals 21.88 26.67
% Community hospitals 98.44 100.00
% Short-term hospitals 98.44 100.00
% Participant in a hospital network 33.33 35.71
% DSH hospitals 28.13 26.67
Hospital ownership
 Government, Nonfederal: Hospital district or authority 1.56 6.67
% Nongovernment, not-for-profit: Church operated 7.81 0.00
% Nongovernment, not-for-profit: Other not-for-
profit 84.38 86.67
% Investor-owned (for-profit): Corporation 6.25 6.67
% Government, federal: Veterans Affairs 0.00 0.00
Average total hospital beds 229.78 252.80
% Hospitals in each bed size category
6-24 beds 4.69 0.00
25-49 beds 9.38 13.33
50-99 beds 14.06 20.00
100-199 beds 28.12 26.67
200-299 beds 15.62 0.00
300-399 beds 12.50 20.00
400-499 beds 4.69 6.67
500 or more beds 10.94 13.33
Average number of admissions 12,074.88 13,642.67
Average inpatient days 61,987.61 68,932.33
Average Medicare inpatient discharges 5,231.20 5,761.67
Average Medicaid inpatient discharges 2,088.06 2,522.60
Average number of mergency outpatient visits 46,983.44 51,384.67
Average number of total outpatient visits 304,308.50 327,945.30
Average payroll expenditures 125,000,000 137,000,000
Average total expenditures 314,000,000 357,000,000
% Net revenue paid on a capitated basis 0.67 0.33
% Net revenue paid on a shared risk basis 3.85 2.56
Average number of full-time physicians and dentists 87.86 134.87
Average number of part-time physicians and dentists 23.83 45.07
Hospital Characteristics
Comparison of Massachusetts Hospital Characteristics in the NIS-HCUP and Casemix Dataset    
Hospital Bed Size & Admissions
Hospital Expenditures, Payment & Employment
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